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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE COURT AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILANCE:
To BUG OR NOT TO BUG -WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION?
The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone -the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable in-
trusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.'
With these words Mr. Justice Brandeis constructed a fourth amend-
ment standard that has yet to be fully adopted by the Supreme Court.2
History reveals that the framers of the Constitution, having had pain-
ful experience with one oppressive governmental tactic, the writs of
assistance,3 and being keenly aware of another, the general warrants
used in England,4 intended to proscribe both. By their own admission,
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966),
described the dangers of continued failure to adopt the Brandeis standard:
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are being re-
corded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his most secret
thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government; when the most
confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying ears.
When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty will be gone. If a man's
privacy can be invaded at will, who can say he is free? If his every word is taken
down and evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can say he enjoys
freedom of speech? If his every association is known and recorded, if the conver-
sations with his associates are purloined, who can say he enjoys freedom of asso.
ciation? When such conditions obtain, our citizens will be afraid to utter any
but the safest and most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with any but
the most acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution envisages it will be
vanished.
Id. at 353-54.
3 Mr. Justice Bradley stated that James Otis's historic argument against the writs of
assistance was "perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the
colonies to the oppressions of the mother country." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 625.
Mr. Justice Bradley also refers to the authoritative discussion of this history contained in
COOLEY'S CONsTTioNAL LiMITATIONS. Id. at 625. Professor Cooley states that "if in
English history we inquire into the original occasion for these constitutional provisions
[fourth amendment], we shall probably find it in the abuse of executive authority, and in
the unwarrantable intrusion of executive agents into the houses and among the private
papers of individuals in order to obtain evidence of political offenses either committed or
designed." I COOLEYS's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, ch. X, at 612 (8th Ed. 1927).
4 See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765); Leach v. Three
of the King's Messengers, 19 Howell's State Trials 1002 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's
State Trials 1154 (1763). These cases have been characterized by the Court as "one of the
permanent monuments of the British Constitution ... [a] monument of English freedom
... the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law [whose] propositions were in
the minds of those who formed the Fourth Amendment." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 626-27 (1885).
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
those charged with interpreting the Constitution only recently began
to stress, however, that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.""
The fourth amendment has a dual function, the aspects of which
may be described as operative (negative) and protective (positive). The
operative function is exclusionary: it prevents unreasonable intru-
sions by governmental agencies. This procedural safeguard requires the
government to obtain a warrant, based upon a prior showing of prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation and specifically describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Closely related to the operative function is the protective function,
that is, the safeguarding of an affirmative right of privacy. The warrant
requirement is designed to ensure that the decision to invade an indi-
vidual's personal privacy and freedom will be based on an impartial
showing of probable cause, that reasonable limits will be placed on the
scope of the intrusion, and "that it may not have the breadth, general-
ity, and long life of the general warrant against which the fourth
amendment was aimed."7
In 1967 the Supreme Court issued a landmark electronic surveil-
lance decision, Katz v. United States.8 Until Katz, the Court had articu-
lated its fourth amendment thinking only in terms of property-based
tests. Katz rejected this approach and emphasized the privacy of the
individual. The scope of the fourth amendment's proscription of un-
reasonable searches and seizures was enlarged to include any effort on
the part of the government to obtain information which resulted in an
intrusion upon an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy.9
5 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Court explained:
Once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people -and not simply
"areas" - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure.
Id. at 353.
o U.S. CONsr. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, andpar-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.
7"United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 758 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
8 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91d. at 351. For a discussion of privacy and the fourth amendment, see L CLARK,
CRIME IN AmmucA (1970); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475 (1968); Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43
N.Y.U.L. REV. 968 (1968). Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, set forth two fourth amend-
ment requirements for protection from intrusion: (1) that there be an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy; and (2) that this expectation be recognized as reasonable by
society. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In Katz, the Court declared that searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without the prior approval of a judge or magistrate,
were "per se unreasonable" under the fourth amendment."0 This stan-
dard, the Court stressed, is subject only to "a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions,""' a statement that touched off
a continuing search for loopholes in an ever narrowing field of possible
exceptions.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White gave his view of the
exceptions intended, stating, "[This] decision does not reach national
security cases."'1 He concluded:
We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate'sjudgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal
officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of
national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reason-
able.' 3
Mr. Justice White's statement was enthusiastically endorsed by the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice as authorizing the ex-
ecutive branch to use electronic surveillance in "national security"
cases without prior judicial approval whenever the executive branch
determined the surveillance to be reasonable.
10 389 U.S. at 857. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 876 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964); Chapman
v. United States, 865 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); Rios v. United States, 864 U.S. 253, 261
(1960); Jones v. United States, 857 U.S. 498, 497-99 (1958).
11389 U.S. at 857. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 408 U.S. 443, 459-64 (1971);
Chimel v. California, 895 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warden v.
Hayden, 887 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967); Cooper v. United States, 886 U.S. 58 (1967); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-77 (1949); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
454-56 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 152, 156 (1925). Each of these cases
dealt with a situation in which the subject of the warrantless search would probably have
disposed of incriminating evidence had the search been delayed until a warrant was ob-
tained. The exception to the warrant requirement is preserved in these cases. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, supra at 454-55.
12889 U.S. at 363 (White, J., concurring). Mr. Justice White relied on a footnote
appearing in the Court's opinion. The pertinent footnote reads:
Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question
not presented by this case.
Id. at 358 n23. Justices Douglas and Brennan strongly disagreed with Justice White's
conclusion, stating that it gave "a wholly unwarranted green light" to the executive
branch to resort to electronic surveillance, without prior judicial authorization, in cases
which the executive branch itself labels as "national security" matters. Id. at 859-60
(Douglas, J., concurring).
1S Id. at 864. The Government relied upon this conclusion by Mr. Justice White in
arguing United States v. Sinclair, 821 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich., 1971), aff'd. sub nom.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See, e.g.,
Government's Trial Memorandum at 10 [hereinafter Trial Memorandum]; Govern-
ment's Memorandum in Support of its Petition for Mandamus at 20, United States
v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Petition
[Vol. 47:76
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Although reinforced by Congressional legislation,14 this position
has met continuing attack in the courts.15 It has been noted that defense
attorneys not infrequently make pre-trial motions "to compel the
United States to disclose certain electronic surveillance information
and to conduct a hearing to determine whether this information
'tainted' the evidence on which the indictment was based or which the
Government intended to offer at trial."'16
The past two years, in particular, have seen a fast-paced develop-
ment of fourth amendment law. In its first ruling on the "national
security" electronic surveillance question, the Supreme Court, in the
recent case of United States v. United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan,'7 held squarely against the Government's
position, affirming the district court's granting of defense counsel's mo-
tion to discover and inspect electronic surveillance information in-
volving the defendant.15
Lawrence Plamondon, whose conversation was overheard on the
wiretap at issue in Eastern District, was one of three men indicted for
a conspiracy to destroy Government property. He was also indicted
individually for the dynamite-bombing of the Central Intelligence
Agency's office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The Government stipulated
that its agents overheard Plamondon on a "national security" electronic
surveillance of which he was not the subject. Nevertheless, defense
for Writ of Mandamus]; Brief for Petitioner at 11, United States v. United States Dist.
Court, ED. Mich., 407 US. 297 (1972) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
14 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
(1970). See particularly § 2511(3).
15 For example, there are cases involving challenges to warrantless electronic sur-
veilance for the sole purpose of gathering foreign security intelligence information.
E.g., United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S.
698 (1971); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970); United States v. Stone,
305 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1969); United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1969).
There have also been numerous challenges to warrantless gathering of domestic security
intelligence information. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (F.D. Mich. 1971),
aff'd sub. nor., United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297
(1972); United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (CD. Cal. 1971), vacated and re-
manded sub. nom., Ferguson v. United States, 408 U.S. 915 (1972); United States v. Hoff-
man, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Ahmad, 335 F. Supp. 1198 (M.D. Pa.
1971); United States v. Jaffe, No. 17 Crim. 480 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1971); United States v.
Donghi, No. CR 1970-81 (W.D.N.Y. May 14, 1971); United States v. Hilliard, Crim. No. 69-
141 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 1971); United States v. O'Neal, No. KC-CR 1204 (D. Kan. Sept. 1,
1970); United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 180 (N.D. IM. Feb. 20, 1970).
16 United States v. United States Dist. Court, ED. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 299-300 (1972).
17 Id.
Is Id. at 324.
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attorneys made and the district court granted a discovery motion which
was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court, per Mr. Justice Powell, underlined the importance of
the "national security" issue "for the people of our country and their
Government.... Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requir-
ing sensitivity both to the Government's right to protect itself from un-
lawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's right to be secure in
his privacy against unreasonable Government intrusion."'19
Justice Powell emphasized that "this case involves only the do-
mestic aspects of national security ... [not] the issues which may be
involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents."2 0
In light of the recent order in Russo v. Byrne (the Pentagon papers
case),21 the Court may soon be called on to finally answer the question
whether any exception to the warrant requirement exists at all in the
area of "national security" electronic surveillance. Only one month
after the Eastern District holding, Mr. Justice Douglas ordered a stay
in district court proceedings in the Russo case until the defendants can
appeal to the United States Supreme Court "their assertion that the
Government should be required to disclose details of a wiretapped con-
versation involving a defense lawyer or consultant. ' 22 The Government
asserts that the conversation was conducted on a telephone involved in
a "foreign intelligence" investigation.23 The Supreme Court has denied
the Government's motion to convene a special session of the full Court
to consider Mr. Justice Douglas's stay order.24
Before discussing the Eastern District and Russo cases, it is useful
to examine the background of warrantless electronic surveillance in
this country. The historical development will be presented as follows:
first, the Olmstead doctrine and the evolution of warrantless eavesdrop-
ping; second, the Roosevelt memorandum and subsequent executive
authorizations; third, the Katz-Alderman warrant and disclosure re-
quirements; fourth, the Government's contentions; fifth, Eastern Dis-
trict and its consequences, including Russo v. Byrne; sixth, a postscript.
19 Id. at 299.
20 Id. at 321-22. The Court of Appeals placed similar limits on the scope of its
opinion:
We do not decide what the President of the United States can or cannot lawfully
do under his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Cief of the Army and
Navy to defend this country from attack, espionage or sabotage by forces or
agents of a foreign power.
444 F. 2d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 1971).
2141 U.S.L.W. 2066 (July 29, 1972).
22 N.Y. Times, July 80, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
23 Id., at 22, col. I. For a discussion of "foreign intelligence" surveillance, see text
accompanying notes 163-170 infra.
24 N.Y. Times, August 6, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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I. THE Olmstead DOCTRINE AND THE PRACTICE OF
WARRANTLESS EAVESDROPPING
In the first Supreme Court case involving wiretapping, Olmstead
v. United States,25 the Court held that the fourth amendment did not
prohibit wiretapping without a warrant. This decision was based on
the rationale that conversations were incapable of being "seized." Oln-
stead had been convicted of conspiracy to violate the National Prohibi-
tion Act. The information had been obtained by means of wiretaps
on the telephone of the alleged conspirators. The taps had been made
without any trespass upon any defendant's property.26 Justice Taft,
speaking for the majority, ruled that the specific language of the fourth
amendment applied only to material objects subjected to government
search and seizure accompanied by a trespass. 27
The Olmstead majority ignored the amicus curiae brief submitted
by the telephone companies in which they argued that the nature of
telephone service requires privacy.28 Instead, the majority adopted the
position that the fourth amendment "cannot justify enlargement of the
language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses,
persons, papers, and effects, so as to apply the words search and seizure
as to forbid hearing or sight."29 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olin-
stead, urged that interpretation of the Constitution must keep pace
with technology. He warned that the Court must recognize the funda-
mental rights protected by the Constitution.30
In 1934, Congress enacted Section 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934.31 Section 605 provided that:
25277 U.S. 438 (1928).
20 Id. at 457. Wiretapping entails planting an electronic device which picks up both
ends of a conversation over the tapped telephone. Bugging involves a microphone which
picks up conversations in a room but not both ends of a telephone call. Both methods
are covered under the general term, electronic surveillance. Graham, Police Eavesdropping:
Law-Enforcement Revolution, 7 Caim. L. BuLL. 445,449 (1971).
27277 U.S. at 464. But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (violation of
fourth amendment despite a lack of trespass). Mr. Justice Bradley in his opinion in Boyd
referred to two English cases, Wilkes v. Wood and Entick v. Carrington:
The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick v. Carrington] affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the con-
crete form of the case then before the court with its adventitious circumstances;
they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security ...
Id. (emphasis added).
28277 U.S. 438, 439-47 (1928).
291d. at 465.
30 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 1 supra.
31 Ch. 652, Title VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp.
V, 1970).
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No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communi-
cation to any person.82
In Nardone v. United States,33 the Court held that Section 605 pro-
hibited wiretapping by law enforcement officials for the purpose of
procuring evidence.34 It also held that the introduction at trial of wire-
tapping evidence is a violation of the "clear language that 'no person'
shall divulge or publish the message or its substance to 'any person'. 13
Apparently, the Justice Department viewed Nardone as merely
precluding divulgence, not wiretapping itself, and did not consider dis-
closure within the department to be "divulgence." 3 6 The second Nar-
done case3" involved information obtained from the original wiretap
but without direct testimony as to the content of the intercepted con-
versation. The Court held that any use of the improper interception
was forbidden as "fruit of the poisonous tree."38 Thus, both direct and
derivative use of evidence obtained by wiretapping is prohibited by
Section 605.
However, even after the second Nardone case, the Justice Depart-
ment continued, for a while, to wiretap and use information for agency
purposes.3 9 Then, in 1940, Attorney General Jackson announced that
the department would discontinue wiretapping.4° Shortly thereafter,
President Roosevelt sent a confidential memorandum to Jackson au-
thorizing him to utilize wiretaps in "grave matters involving the defense
of the nation."41
II. ROOSEVELT'S MEMORANDUM (AND LATER EXECUTIVE ORDERS)
The year was 1940. The armies of the Third Reich were marching
at will over an almost defenseless Europe. The United States was widely
82 Id.
83 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
84 Id. at 381.
351d. at 382.
36 See Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CoRN= L.Q. 195, 197
(1954) [hereinafter Brownell].
87 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
38 Id. at 341. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" simile originated in Silverthorne Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Justice Holmes wrote in Silverthorne: "The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that...
evidence so acquired . . . shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. This ruling was an ex-
pansion of the exclusionary rule set forth in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961).
39 Brownell, supra note 36, at 198.
40 Id. at 199.
41 Confidential Memorandum for the Attorney General from President Roosevelt,
May 21, 1940.
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believed to be threatened by agents of the Third Reich, so-called "fifth
columnists," who were working to undermine the defenses of this
country from within. Faced with this critical situation, President Roose-
velt issued a confidential memorandum authorizing Attorney General
Jackson "to secure information by listening devices direct to the con-
versation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive
activities against the Government of the United States, including sus-
pected spies."4 2
Roosevelt modified this broad directive with several qualifications.
He conceded that "under ordinary and normal circumstances wire-
tapping by Government agents should not be carried on for the ex-
cellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights. ' 43
However, in light of the fact that "certain other nations have been en-
gaged in the organization of propaganda of so-called 'fifth columns' in
other countries and in preparation for sabotage, as well as in actual
sabotage," 44 Roosevelt decided the circumstances were neither "ordi-
nary" nor "normal" and that the Supreme Court's decisions were never
intended "to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the na-
tion." 46 Nevertheless, Roosevelt expressly concurred with the Court's
prohibition against "the use of evidence secured over tapped wires in
the prosecution of citizens in criminal cases." 48 In concluding the
memorandum, Roosevelt requested the Attorney General "to limit
these investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them
insofar as possible to aliens."4 7
Roosevelt's decision was part of the United States' preparation for
its confrontation with Japan and Germany. Relatively few people were
to be affected. Moreover, it is extremely important to recognize that
Roosevelt's memorandum was concerned entirely with protecting the
Government of the United States against persons who were working to
overthrow this government on behalf of foreign governments. This
point is crucial because later Attorneys General have based considerably
broader assertions of power on the language of Roosevelt's memoran-
dum.48
In expanding form, Roosevelt's authorization to wiretap has been
continued by successive Presidents. In 1946, Attorney General Tom S.
42Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. See text accompanying notes 163-70 infra.
48 See text accompanying notes 49-59 infra.
19721
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Clark wrote to President Truman requesting an expansion of the wire-
tap authorization.49 Clark said that while he was "reluctant to suggest
any use whatever of those special investigative measures in domestic
cases, it seems to me imperative to use them in cases vitally affecting the
domestic security, or where human life is in jeopardy."' o Clark ex-
plained that the expansion of the wiretap authorization was needed
because of "an increase in subversive activity here at home" and of "a
very substantial increase in crime."'51 Clark did not, however, mention
Roosevelt's request that the surveillances be kept to a minimum and
limited "insofar as possible to aliens." Nevertheless, President Truman
concurred with Clark's request.
In 1954, both Attorney General Brownell and Deputy Attorney
General (now Secretary of State) Rogers wrote articles about wiretap-
ping. Brownell attempted to justify the wiretapping policy by stating:
Everyone agrees that invasion of privacy is repugnant to all Amer-
icans. But how can we possibly preserve the safety and liberty of
everyone in this nation unless we pull federal prosecuting attorneys
out of their strait jackets and permit them to use intercepted evi-
dence in the trial of security cases and other heinous offenses such
as kidnapping?52
However, Brownell stressed the fact that the security cases dealt only
with agents "of a hostile power." 53 From Rogers' article,5 it is clear
that the Justice Department did not consider that the then existing law
allowed the use of wiretap evidence in criminal cases even in espionage
matters. Rogers wrote that:
[L]aw enforcement officers possessed of intercepted information
vital to the security of the nation may not use such information in
bringing spies and saboteurs to justice in our federal courts. 5
In 1965, a further relaxation of constitutional requirements by the
executive branch occurred. Despite his view that "the invasion of pri-
49 Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to President Truman, July
17, 1946. President Truman concurred with the memorandum on July 17, 1947.
o Id.
51 d.
52 Brownell, supra note 36, at 201.
53 We might just as well face up to the fact that the communists are subversives
and conspirators working fanatically in the interests of a hostile foreign power.
Id. at 201. Brownell effectively eliminated the use of wiretapping in domestic security
cases, i.e., domestic political organizations whose views are inconsistent with our present
forms of government. See United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 429.
54 Rogers, The Case for Wiretapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954).
55 Id. at 793. This was a statutory limitation rather than a constitutional one (Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1935 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the second Nardone case). See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
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vacy of communications is a highly offensive practice which should be
engaged in only where the national security is at stake,"56 President
Johnson established basic guidelines for wiretapping. 7 With regard to
the "utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear non-
telephone conversations," Johnson saw "substantial and unsolved ques-
tions of Constitutional interpretation."5 i8 He ordered "each agency con-
ducting such investigations [to] consult with the Attorney General to
ascertain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord with the law
and with a decent regard for the rights of others."5 9
III. KATz AND THE NEED FOR A WARRANT; ALDERMAN
AND THE NEED FOR DISCLOSURE
As discussed earlier, the Olmstead case was the first Supreme Court
decision to deal with the question of wiretapping. The Olmstead deci-
sion established two criteria, one of which had to be met before a war-
rant would be required in search and seizure (including wiretap) cases:
1) the subject of the search or seizure had to be something tangible; or
2) a trespass had to be made.60 Since wiretap cases could not qualify
under the first criterion, fourth amendment protection was denied to
the subject of a tap except in those instances where the surveillance
instrument was planted by means of trespass. In Goldman v. United
States,61 the Olmstead wiretap doctrine was applied to bugging. 2 Gold-
man involved a listening device which had been placed against a parti-
tion wall and used to monitor conversations in the next room. The
O Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from Presi-
dent Johnson, June 30, 1965.
57 Id. The telephone guidelines read:
1. No federal personnel is to intercept telephone conversations within the United
States by any mechanical or electronic device, without the consent of one of
the parties involved (except in connection with investigations related to the
national security);
2. No interceptions shall be undertaken or continued without first obtaining the
approval of the Attorney General;
3. All federal agencies shall immediately conform their practices and proce-
dures to the provisions of this order.
58 Id.
59 Id. When the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was passed, President
Johnson was quoted as saying:
Congress, in my judgment, has taken an unwise and potentially dangerous step by
sanctioning eavesdropping and wiretapping by Federal, state, and local officials
in an almost unlimited variety of situations.... Thus, I believe that this action
goes far beyond the effective and legitimate needs of law enforcement.... I call
upon the Congress immediately to reconsider the unwise provisions of Title III
and to take steps to repeal them.... We need not surrender our privacy to win
the war on crime.
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1968, at 23, col. 4.
60 See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
61316 U.S. 129 (1942).
62 See note 26 supra.
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Court admitted the evidence so obtained and noted that, because no
physical trespass took place, there was no fourth amendment viola-
tion.6
The first Olmstead doctrine requirement was implicitly over-
turned by the Court in Silverman v. United States" and explicitly re-
jected in Wong Sun v. United States.65 In Silverman, police inserted a
spike microphone into the petitioners' room. The Court concluded that
admission of the conversations overheard violated the fourth amend-
ment. The Court stressed that the "decision here.., is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."66
The Court also found "no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but
...decline[d] to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch."67
In Wong Sun, the Court explicitly eliminated any lingering uncer-
tainty and brought verbal communication within the range of the
fourth amendment. It was held that:
The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial phys-
ical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result
of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman
v. United States [citations omitted] that the Fourth Amendment
may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as
against the more traditional seizure of "papers and effects." ...
Thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlaw-
ful entry and unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the pres-
ent case is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more
common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.68
The second aspect of the Olmstead doctrine, the trespass require-
ment, was first undermined by Silverman and Berger v. New York. 69
Later, Katz v. United States expressly overruled both Olmstead and
Goldman, and held that trespass was not a precondition to a violation
of fourth amendment rights.70
63 316 U.S. at 135. Justice Murphy dissented vigorously, stating that imposing the re-
quirement of trespass contravened the spirit of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 139-42.
64 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
65 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
66 365 U.S. at 512.
67 Id.
68 371 U.S. at 485.
69 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATi. U. L.
REv. 296 (1968).
70 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz Court declared:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling.... The fact that the electronic device
employed ...did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance.
Id. at 353.
[Vol. 47:76
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
In Berger, the Court agreed that trespassory eavesdropping is con-
trolled by the fourth amendment. However, the Court could not agree
on the standards of reasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment as applied to electronic surveillance cases. 7' The Court
concluded:
It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eaves-
dropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's
requirements. If that be true then the 'fruits' of eavesdropping de-
vices are barred under the Amendment. On the other hand... the
Fourth Amendment does not make the precepts of the home or the
office ... sanctuaries where the law can never reach .... But it
does prescribe a constitutional standard that must be met before
official invasion is permissible. 72
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, warned:
Whether or not the evidence obtained is used at a trial for another
crime, the privacy of the individual has been infringed by the in-
terception of all of his conversations. And, even though the infor-
mation is not introduced as evidence, it can and probably will be
used as leads and background information.73
In Katz, the Court made it clear that the subject of a surveillance
need not be given notice.7 However, the Court objected to the manner
in which the surveillance was conducted. Government agents did not
begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of Katz's activi-
ties had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone
in a public booth to transmit gambling information to persons in other
states, a violation of federal law. The agents confined their surveillance
to the brief periods during which Katz used the public phone and they
took great care to overhear only the conversations of Katz himself. Even
though the agents imposed these restrictions on their eavesdropping,
the Court held that such activity could not be permitted.75 The Court
said that ".... searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
71388 U.S. at 58-60. The standards might include: 1) a showing of probable cause;
2) a description with specificity of the object to be seized; 3) notice to the subject of the
search; 4) a determined limitation on the time of the search; and 5) a return to the magis-
trate specifying the items seized.
72 Id. at 63-64.
73 Id. at 66 (Douglas, J., concurring).
74 889 U.S. 347. The Court said: "Officers need not announce their purpose before
conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." Id. at 355 n.16.
75Id. at 856. The majority opinion asserted:
This Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers rea-
sonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined
their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.
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prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment." 76
In Alderman v. United States,77 the Supreme Court reinforced its
Katz ruling. Unless the government prefers to dismiss its case rather
than to disclose information obtained through illegal eavesdropping,
Alderman held, persons who have standing to object are entitled to
examine the government's eavesdropping records so as to be able to de-
termine to what extent the eavesdropping may have contributed to
the prosecution's case.78 The Court declared, "[s]urveillance records as
to which any [defendant] has standing to object should be turned over
to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge." 79
The Court felt that a determination in an adversary proceeding
as to whether prosecution evidence grew out of illegally overheard
conversations would substantially reduce the margin of error that could
result from the judge's unfamiliarity with the circumstances and facts.
Disclosure would be limited to transcripts of the petitioner's own con-
versations and those of others, taking place on his premises. Alderman
also stated that the trial court should issue enforceable orders to peti-
tioner and his counsel to prevent their unwarranted disclosure of mate-
rials they might now be entitled to inspect.80
In a per curiam opinion, Giordano v. United States,81 the Court
clarified the Alderman adversary hearing requirement by stating that
disclosure is necessary only when the district court determines that the
surveillance was conducted illegally.82
An additional clarification appeared in Taglianetti v. United
76 Id. at 357. The Court continued:
The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification
... that is central to the Fourth Amendment," a procedure that we hold to be a
constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this
case.
Id. at 359.
77 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
78 As to who has standing to object, see id. at 176.
79 Id. at 182. The Court felt that "the task is too complex, and the margin for error
too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court to identify those
records that might have contributed to the Government's case." Id.
80 The Alderman standard was recently applied in United States v. Fannon, 435 F.2d
364 (7th Cir. 1970). There the Circuit Court of Appeals held:
Alderman expressly requires an adversary hearing for one with standing to prove
that his conviction was tainted by use of evidence which arose from illegal moni-
toring of conversations, either of his or of others upon his premises, whether
or not he was present or participated in the latter. Where illegal monitoring is
conceded, a petitioner must have an opportunity to prove that a substantial part
of the case against him was the fruit of the government's illegal conduct.
Id. at 366.
81394 U.S. 310 (1969).
82 Id. at 313, noting, "Of course, a finding by the District Court that the surveillance
was lawful would make disclosure and further proceedings unnecessary."
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States,3 where a federal district court's in camera determination that
the defendant had not participated in conversations overheard through
electronic surveillance was held to preclude the defendant from obtain-
ing disclosure of government records of such surveillance. The Court
stated that "[n]othing in Alderman v. United States ... requires an
adversary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue
raised by electronic surveillance."8 4 The Court reasoned that an adver-
sary proceeding and disclosure were required in Alderman "not for
lack of confidence in the integrity of government counsel or the trial
judge, but only because the in camera procedures at issue there would
have been an inadequate means to safeguard a defendant's fourth
amendment rights."8 5
IV. TnE DEPARTUENT OF JUsTICE AND ITS RATIONALE
FOR WARANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
IN DomESTic SECURITY CASES
In United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan,8" the Justice Department took the position that
the President can conduct warrantless surveillance under the authority
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The major
thrust of this comprehensive statute is to make unauthorized electronic
surveillance a federal crime punishable by a fine of $10,000, or im-
prisonment of up to five years, or both. The general rule of the Act
is that Government surveillance is permitted only upon a showing of
probable cause and the issuance of a warrant. An exception to this
general rule permits the President to legally authorize electronic sur-
veillance "to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States."
The Act also provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1939 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such mea-
sures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States, or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained
in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
83 Id. at 316.
84 Id. at 317.
85 Id.
86 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force
or other unlawful means, or against any clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the Government.87
This last provision presents a major problem because it extends
the Presidential exemption in "language so broad that it might be
construed to embrace... any black militant or radical group such as
the Black Panther Party, the Students for Democratic Society (SDS), the
'Yippies', or any other 'subversive' organization even though it has no
credible links to a foreign power."88 The idea that a dissident domestic
organization is akin to an unfriendly foreign power, and must therefore
be dealt with in the same fashion, has permeated much of the Justice
Department's argumentation in cases where it has been called on to
defend its eavesdropping policies. In its Memorandum of Law to the
court of appeals in Eastern District, the Justice Department wrote:
Faced with such a state of affairs, any President who takes
seriously his oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion" could readily determine that it is necessary, and hardly "un-
reasonable," to utilize electronic surveillance to gather intelligence
information concerning those organizations which have committed
themselves, in many instances publicly, to the use of illegal methods
to bring about changes in our constitutional form of Government
and which may be seeking to create an atmosphere in which it
would be almost impossible for the Government to function.8 9
Essentially, the Justice Department seeks to limit court inquiry to
a determination of the non-judicial "reasonableness" of the govern-
ment's activity rather than a judgment as to the constitutionality of
searching without a warrant. In United States v. Hilliard,0 Justice
Gray of the District Court for the Central District of California re-
jected this position writing that "[ilt is not the job of the court to
question whether or not a particular decision of the President or the
Attorney General would be reasonable, but it seems to me that that
is irrelevant. Reasonableness on the part of an executive is no substitute
for constitutional restriction." 91
87 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968). See Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitu-
tional Development From Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 513, 544-45 (1968).
88 Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law
and Order", 67 MicH. L. Ray. 455, 491 (1968). This provision of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act ignores the limitation that President Roosevelt placed upon his memorandum.
See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
89 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 7-8. It is interesting to note that almost the
same language was used by the Government in United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. at
427 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
90 39 U.S.L.W. 2679 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 1971).
91 Id. at 2680. But see United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 444
F.2d at 675 (6th Cir. 1971), wherein Judge Weick, dissenting, stated:
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As an example of the Government's attitude, the Justice Depart-
ment in the Eastern District case asserted that, despite the fact that a
warrant was not obtained prior to instituting the surveillance, it was
nevertheless a constitutionally proper surveillance because the Attorney
General of the United States expressly authorized it "to gather intel-
ligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from at-
tempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of Government." 92 The Justice Department emphasized that
the purpose of the surveillance involved was "not to gather evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution but rather to provide intelligence
information needed to protect against the illegal attacks of such orga-
nizations."93
A similar justification was rejected by Judge Ferguson of the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California in United States v.
Smith:
Due to the various constitutional guaranties protecting political
freedom, the government can act only to prevent or punish unlaw-
ful acts. 94
This limitation appears to have been conveniently overlooked by
the Justice Department along with the fact that activities of domestic
organizations "become criminal only where it can be shown that the
activity was/is carried on through unlawful means, such as the invasion
of the rights of others by use of force or violence."9 5 Moreover, the
affidavit of the Attorney General submitted to the court below in
Eastern District made "no assertion that at the time the wiretaps were
installed, law enforcement agents had probable cause to believe that
criminal activity ... was being plotted."96
The position urged by the Justice Department was only briefly
adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Rabinowitz, 97 where
the Court reasoned that "even assuming the police officers had time to
When the Chief Executive deems it necessary to gather intelligence information
for this purpose [i.e., to cope with the destruction of public buildings by sabo-
teurs] he ought not to be required first to make detailed explanations of classified
information to a magistrate and procure his consent as a condition precedent to
the exercise of his constitutional powers.
On the problem of reasonableness, see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 18 n.15 (1968).
92 Brief for Petitioner at 3. This is the essence of the Attorney General's affidavit.
93 Trial Memorandum at 9.
94 United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
95 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1079 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (emphasis added).
O6 Id.
97 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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procure a warrant, they were not bound to do so because the search
was otherwise reasonable."98
However, in Chimel v. California,99 the Rabinowitz theory of "rea-
sonableness" was specifically rejected. The Court said:
The amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" must be read in light of the "history that gave rise to the
words" -a history of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to
be one of the potent causes of the revolution. The amendment was
in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless
searches that so alienated the colonists and had helped spread the
movement for independence. In the scheme of the amendment
therefore, the requirement that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause" plays a crucial part.100
In arguing for an exception to the warrant requirement, the Gov-
ernment has not claimed immunity from all judicial review. It concedes
that "the courts may [later] review [the warrantless surveillance] to de-
termine its conformity with the standard of the Fourth Amendment."' 0 '
However, the Government has hedged even this concession with
numerous qualifications that make doubtful the meaningfulness of the
acknowledged review power. For example, it has been argued that the
scope of such a post-surveillance judicial review should be "extremely
limited." Only when the Attorney General is "arbitrary and capri-
cious" 0 2 in his determination that the surveillance relates to national
98 Id. at 64.
99 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
100 Id. at 760-61. (emphasis added). See ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUs-
TcE, ELrw oNmC SURVEILLANCE § 5.4, commentary (1968). The warrant's "probable cause"
requirement must therefore be interpreted as crucial to the scheme of the Fourth Amend-
ment. A warrant should be viewed as the exclusive prerequisite to the reasonableness of
a search, unless such procedure is precluded by practical necessity. See also Schwartz,
supra note 88, at 489; Comment, Privacy and Political Freedom: Application of the
Fourth Amendment to "National Security" Investigations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 1205, 1230-33
(1970).
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court held unconstitutional
a warrant issued upon a determination of probable cause by the State's Attorney General.
The Court, per Mr. Justice Stewart, reaffirmed Chimel and rejected an attempted revival
of the Rabinowitz interpretation of reasonableness. Id. at 473-84.
101 Brief for Petitioner at 21. The danger in this post factum review is inadvertently
pointed out by the Government:
Normally, such judicial review would not take place until a criminal prosecution
has been initiated - and, of course, most national security electronic surveillances
do not result in prosecutions.
Id. (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 22. The government contends that only when "it constitutes a clear abuse
of the broad discretion that the Attorney General has to obtain all information that will
be helpful to the President in protecting the government against overthrow ... by force
or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to [its] structure
or existence (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968)" should the court rule
the surveillance invalid. The Government further insists that "[t]he possibility of such
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security matters should the court not sustain the validity on the sur-
veillance.13 The government also asserts: "The court should not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the Attorney General on whether the
particular organization, person or event involved has a sufficient nexus
to protection of the national security to justify the surveillance.' ' 04
The Government further insists "that the courts rarely would be
able to make an informed judgment on the necessity for the particular
inquiry."'' 05 This assertion is based on the contention that "all such
matters [of national security] involve highly complex factors that make
judicial scrutiny impracticable .. "06
As its final reason for exemption from the warrant requirement,
the Government maintains that disclosure to a magistrate of a signifi-
cant portion of the information involved in national security surveil-
lance "would create serious potential dangers to the national security
and to the lives of informants and agents .... [because] [s]ecrecy is
the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering."'' 0 7 The Government
believes that "requiring prior judicial authorization would create a
greater 'danger of leaks... because in addition to the judge, you have
the clerk, the stenographer and some other officer like a law assistant
or bailiff who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance.' u08
an abuse, however, is not a valid basis for denying the Attorney General the authority."
Id. at 35.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 27 n.10. The Government states:
The Attorney General personally authorizes each national security surveillance,
and does so only when he concludes that the information to be attained thereby
is essential to the protection of the government. One result of this careful and
personal review by the Attorney General is that the number of such surveillances
is closely limited.
Id. (emphasis added). This contention has been put in doubt by the recent string of cases
in which the electronic surveillance was invalidated because the Attorney General or his
Assistant had not personally authorized such surveillance. Robinson v. United States, -
F.2d - (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 1972); United States v. Narducci, 841 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa.
1972); United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 874 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Aquino,
338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D.
Pa. 1972); United States v. Chal, 336 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Contra, United States
v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405 (M.D.
Fla. 1972); United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ga. 1972); United States v.
lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
105 Id. at 22.
106 Id. at 7. The point is repeated later in the Government's brief:
In national security surveillance cases.., generally [the justification for the sur-
veillance] involves a large number of detailed and complicated facts whose inter-
relation may not be obvious to one who does not have extensive background in-
formation, and the drawing of subtle inferences.
Id. at 25.
107 1d. at 24-25.
108 Id. at 25. The "danger of leaks" theory was first propounded by former Attorney
General Brownell in 1954. Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 Coana.L
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Thus, the Government reasons, if court scrutiny of surveillance prac-
tices is required at all, the requirement would be satisfied by post-
surveillance judicial review of a type "extremely limited" in scope due
to danger of leaks and the presence of highly complex factors beyond
the competence of the nation's trial judges.
Anticipating that its plea for a national security exemption from
the warrant requirement might meet failure, the Government presented
a fallback argument in Eastern District: if a surveillance is ruled un-
lawful, it was asserted, the courts should be permitted to determine in
camera "whether the information obtained thereby is arguably relevant
to a prosecution before turning the material over to a defendant." 10 9
Behind this assertion is the fear that, if the Alderman'" rule of
automatic disclosure were followed, the Government would be forced
"either to drop the prosecution of an often serious crime or to reveal
sensitive secret information.""'
V. UNITED STATES V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DisnucRT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN
DIVISION
The background of this case is the pending criminal trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan of
three men charged with conspiracy to destroy Government property
in Ann Arbor, Michigan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. One of them,
Lawrence Plamondon, was also charged with destruction of Govern-
ment property (dynamite bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor) in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361.
In the course of pre-trial proceedings, defendants filed a motion for
L.Q. 195, 210 (1954). Circuit Judge Edwards, in the court of appeals decision in Eastern
District, aptly answered the Government's contentions:
If there be a need for increased security in the presentation of certain applica-
tions for search warrant in the federal court, these are administrative problems
amenable to solution through the Chief Justice of the United States and the
United States Judicial Conference and its affiliated judicial organizations.
444 F.2d at 666.
109 Brief for Petitioner at 36.
110 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). As Mr. Justice White reasoned for
the Court:
An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to
be a neutral person or event .... may have special significance to one who knows
the more intimate facts of the accused's life. And yet that information may be
wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all rele-
vant circumstances. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in our view
the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the
in camera judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have
contributed to the Government's case.
Id. at 182 (footnotes omitted).
ill Brief for Petitioner at 8.
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disclosure of certain electronic surveillance information. In response,
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledg-
ing that Plamondon had participated in conversations which were over-
heard by government agents.112 The logs of these surveillances were
filed in a sealed exhibit for in camera inspection by the district court.
The district court held that the surveillance violated the fourth amend-
ment and ordered full disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard con-
versations. 118 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stayed the
order of the district court pending hearing and final disposition of
the Government's petition for a writ of mandamus." 4 The court of
appeals held that the surveillances were unlawful and the district
court had properly required disclosure of the overheard conversa-
tions.1  The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari." 6
In his opinion for the Court in Eastern District, Mr. Justice Powell
stressed the limited scope of the decision, noting that the case, one of
first impression, involves only the domestic aspects of national security.
There is no opinion as to "the issues which may be involved with re-
spect to activities of foreign powers or their agents." -" 7 An expansive
factor is also present, however, since Justice Powell emphasized equally
that the Court's decision does not rest on statutory grounds (not "the
language of § 2511(3) or any other section of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968"118).
The Court's Eastern District inquiry is a narrow one. It faces the
question posed by "footnote 23" in the Katz decision:
Whether safeguards other than prior authorizations by a magis-
112 Plamondon was not the subject of the surveillance in question:
[he surveillance was directed to a wholly independent organization, of which
Plamondon was not a member, on the basis of information available to the At-
torney General from other intelligence operations. Plamondon was overheard
during conversations with this organization.
Id. at 30 n.13.
113 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
114The court of appeals' jurisdiction was challenged. The Court admitted that "[i]t
is clear that the District Court order under attack is a pretrial order, interlocutory in
nature, and hence, not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . ." 444 F.2d at 655. But the
Court relied for its jurisdiction on the "All Writs" Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964). "The
Courts of Appeals have the power to review by mandamus 'an issue of first impression'
involving a basic and undecided problem." Id. at 656 (citations omitted).
115 Id. at 669.
116403 U.S. 930 (1971).
117 United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 322.
Justice Powell stated, "Further, the instant case requires no judgment on the scope
of the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or without this country." Id. at 308.
1188ld. at 322. "This case raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance
as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968." Id. at 308.
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trate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving
the national security .... 139
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2511(3), contains a provision that nothing limits the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to protect against the overthrow of Govern-
ment. As we have seen, the Government relies on § 2511(3) in support
of its contention that "in excepting national security surveillances from
the Act's warrant requirement, Congress recognized the President's au-
thority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval."'2 0
The Court reasons, however, that Section 2511(3) does not itself
confer any power to conduct warrantless national security surveillances
but is merely a neutral disclaimer of Congressional intent to limit the
President's constitutional powers in matters affecting the national se-
curity.121 The Court refers to the colloquy among Senators Hart, Hol-
land and McClellan as supportive of its reasoning. 22 It concludes that
"nothing in § 2511(3) was intended to expand or to contract or to de-
fine whatever presidential surveillance powers existed in matters affect-
ing the national security." 2S
The Court confronts the "delicate question" of national security
by adopting a balancing test: the Government's duty to protect the
domestic security 24 is to be weighed against the potential danger to
individual privacy and free expression posed by unreasonable surveil-
lance. 2 5 As the Court points out, "National security cases . . . often
119 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23. See note 12 supra.
120 Brief for Petitioner at 7.
121 The Court states:
We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that Congress only intended to
make clear that the Act simply did not legislate with respect to national security
surveillances.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 306 (emphasis added).
See also Note, The "National Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or Judicial
Responsibility, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 888 (1972).
122 Noteworthy is Senator Hart's statement:
[N]othing in Section 2511(3) even attempts to define the limits of the President's
national security power under present law, which I have always found extremely
vague ... Section 2511(3) merely says that if the President has such power, then
its exercise is in no way affected by Title III."
114 CONG. Rac. 14,751 (daily ed. May 23, 1968), quoted in United States v. United States
Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 307.
123 407 U.S. at 308.
124 The Court observes:
It would be contrary to the public interest for Government to deny to itself theprudent and lawful employment of those very techniques which are employed
against the Government and its law abiding citizens.
Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
125 The Court also observes:
There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this ca-pability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens.
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reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values ....
Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the
targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy
in their political beliefs."' 26
One must remember that the fourth amendment guarantees are
absolute protections only against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
And as the Court points out, "reasonableness" turns, at least in part,
on the more specific commands of the warrant clause: "probable cause"
for the warrant and its issuance by a "neutral and detached magis-
trate."127
The fourth amendment does not contemplate a "least intrusive
means" test.128 Nor does the fourth amendment contemplate, as the
Government argues,129 an "extremely limited" post-surveillance judicial
review. 130 The fourth amendment contemplates "a prior judicial judg-
ment" - a "[p]rior review by a neutral and detached magistrate."' 3'
In reply to the Government's argument for a Presidential excep-
tion to the warrant requirement in domestic security surveillances,
Eastern District recognizes the constitutional basis of the President's
domestic security role. However, because of the risk of "infringement
of constitutionally protected privacy of speech . . . [the President's
domestic security role] must be exercised in a manner compatible with
the Fourth Amendment .. .: an appropriate prior warrant proce-
dure." 3 2
The Government's arguments that issues involved in domestic
security surveillances are "too subtle and complex" and the "secrecy
126 Id. at 313-14.
127 This point was emphasized in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971)
when the Court repeated Mr. Justice Jackson's classic statement on the warrant require-
ment:
[The fourth amendment's] protection consists in requiring that [the usual infer-
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 449, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
128 The Court states that it "has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily con-
fined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end." United States
v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 317 (emphasis added).
129 See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
130 The Court states:
The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unre-
viewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incrim-
inating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.
407 U.S. at 317.
131 Id. at 317, 318. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
132 407 U.S. at 320.
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too essential" for judicial scrutiny are sharply criticized. The Court
concludes:
If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforce-
ment officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question
whether there is probable cause for surveillance.133
And as to the Government's need for secrecy, the Court says that
"[j]udges may be counted upon to be especially conscious of security
requirements in national security cases."' 1 4 The Court suggests that the
"Government itself . . . provide the necessary clerical assistance."'1 35
An application for a warrant, the Court notes, "involves no public
or adversary proceeding: it is an ex parte request before a magistrate or
judge.'U3 6
The result of the Court's balancing test is two-fold: first, a prior
warrant obtained from a "neutral and detached" magistrate gives a
presumption of validity to the surveillance and minimizes the Govern-
ment's burden of justification in a post-surveillance judicial review;
second, the Government's inconvenience is outweighed by the reassur-
ance to the public that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of
law-abiding citizens will not occur.137
The district court's reliance on Alderman in directing the Govern-
ment to disclose to the defendant Plamondon his own unlawfully inter-
cepted conversations is affirmed' 38 by the Supreme Court with a cau-
tion:
[T]he trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a de-
fendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwar-
ranted disclosure of the materials which they may be entitled
to inspect.139
Mr. Justice Powell suggests some protective standards which Con-
gress may wish to consider: the enactment of probable cause require-
ments more appropriate to domestic security cases than section 2518 of
the Omnibus Crime Control Act; designation of a specific court (for
example, the District Court or Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia) to which warrant applications may be addressed in such
133 Id.
L34 Id. at 321.
135 Id. See note 108 supra.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 The decision of the Court was 8-0. The Chief Justice concurred in the result. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred. Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment.
'39 407 U.S. at 324, quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 185 (1969). See
note 80 supra.
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cases; relaxation of the stringent time and reporting requirements of
section 2518.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized the
import of the Eastern District decision by stating:
[W]e are currently in the throes of another national seizure of
paranoia.... We have as much or more to fear from the erosion
of our sense of privacy and independence by the omnipresent ear
of the Government as we do from the likelihood that fomenters of
domestic upheaval will modify our form of governing.140
He also states that it would be extremely difficult to write a search
warrant which specifies the particular conversation to be seized. He
believes that "any such attempt would amount to a general warrant,
the very abuse condemned by the Fourth Amendment."'41
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White agrees only with the
result achieved by the Court. He maintains that the majority has "im-
providently" decided the case on the basis of the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. He claims that the Court should never have
reached the constitutional issue and prefers to find the Government
surveillance illegal because the Attorney General failed to follow the
statutory prescriptions of section 2511(3).142
A week after the Eastern District decision, the Court, in Gelbard
v. United States,143 stated that a grand jury witness who refused to
answer questions because they were based on information obtained by
illegal Government wiretapping had "just cause" that precluded a find-
ing of contempt.
The Court did not base the Gelbard decision on fourth amend-
ment requirements or the constitutionality of Title III. It decided
140 407 U.S. at 329, 333 (Douglas, J., concurring). The appendix to Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas' opinion contains an interesting scale which shows that, whereas court-
ordered listening devices were used an average of 13.1 days in 1970 per device, executive-
ordered devices had an average use from a minimum of 71.7 days per device to a maximum
of 200.0 days per device. Id. at 334.
It is also interesting to note that the average cost of each federal court-approved
wiretap during 1970 was $12,106. There are no figures available for executive-ordered
devices although longer average use times would presumably entail higher costs. Admin-
istrative Office of U.S. Courts, REPORT ON APPLICATION FOR ORDERs AUTHORIZING OR AP-
PROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 17 (April 1971).
141 407 U.S. at 333 n.14.
142 Mr. Justice White also does not agree with the Court's analysis of § 2511(3). Id.
at 338 n.2. In addition, he maintains that:
[W]hat Congress excepted from the warrant requirement was a surveillance which
the President would assume responsibility for deeming an essential measure to
protect against clear and present danger. No judge can satisfy this congressional
requirement.
Id. at 343.
143 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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the case on the basis of section 2515 which bars the use, as evidence
before official bodies, of the contents and fruits of illegal interceptions.
Mr. Justice White again concurred in the Court's opinion and
judgment. He reasoned that where court approval is required and the
Government has intercepted communications without a warrant, then
28 U.S.C. § 1826 does not require the grand jury witness to testify.144
However, Mr. Justice White makes a comment which will probably
cause as much controversy and misunderstanding as his exception state-
ment in Katz. 145 He asserts:
[W]here the Government officially denies the fact of electronic
surveillance of the witness, the matter is at an end and the witness
must answer. 146
On July 21, 1972, three weeks after the Gelbard decision, the Gov-
ernment did officially deny' 47 that electronic surveillance had taken
place in a case that will reach the Supreme Court as Russo v. Byrne.
Defendants Anthony J. Russo, Jr. and Dr. Daniel Ellsberg are accused
of obtaining and distributing for publication copies of the secret Pen-
tagon papers which document the development of this country's role
in the Vietnam war. Although the Government, in response to a de-
fense motion to disclose electronic surveillance, apparently denied that
it had taken place, the district court judge subsequently revealed in
open court that the Government had in fact overheard at least one
defense attorney or consultant by means of electronic surveillance.148
Judge Byrne of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California ruled, however, that "no further disclosure [other
than his in camera inspection] of details was warranted.' ' 49
His ruling that disclosure was unnecessary was based on his deci-
sion "that the overheard conversation did not relate to the confidential
attorney-client relationship."'S 0 This appears to be the first time' 5' that
a judge has been confronted with the question whether an adversary
144 Id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
145 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
146 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
147 N.Y. Times, July 23, 1972, at 5, col. 1. A special prosecutor filed an affidavit stating
that the defense had not been the target of wiretapping and that no member of the de-
fense team had been overheard, "except as may heretofore be disclosed to the court in
camera."
148 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1972, at 15, col. 1. One defense attorney protested that "the
Government's attorneys had only given the defense the first statement, implying that no
eavesdropping was known to have taken place, while the same day the Government was
secretly informing the judge that it had." Id.
149 N.Y. Times, July 27, 1972, at 5, col. 2.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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hearing, as per Alderman, must occur when a member of the defense
team, rather than the defendant himself, has been overheard on a
Government electronic surveillance.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unani-
mously upheld the district court's decision that the defendants lacked
standing to see the transcript of the telephone conversation and refused
to issue a writ of mandamus to order Judge Byrne to make the Gov-
ernment disclose details of the wiretap. The court said a defendant
lacked standing to see such a transcript because the conversation did
not involve the client's relationship with the overheard person. 1 2 The
court did grant that "[i]f, however, the interceptions were 'relevant'
to the trial, it would seem that they would have 'standing.' 'u3
After the circuit court's decision, the defense attorneys immedi-
ately petitioned for a stay from Supreme Court Justice William 0.
Douglas. In an extraordinary hearing in the Post Office building in
Yakima, Washington, Mr. Justice Douglas was informed by David Nis-
sen, the Justice Department's special prosecutor, that "the wiretap was
a 'foreign intelligence' device installed on the authority of the Attorney
General without a court warrant. 'u1 Mr. Nissen also revealed that a
member of the defense was called on the "tapped" telephone "but did
not discuss the Pentagon papers case."'155
On July 29, 1972, Mr. Justice Douglas, in what he labeled "a rather
drastic procedure,"'15 stayed the opening of the trial in the district
court until the defendants could appeal to the United States Supreme
Court the question of the necessity of an Alderman adversary hearing
with respect to overheard conversations of a defense attorney or con-
sultant.
Mr. Justice Douglas rejected the reasoning of the lower courts,
holding that the "standing" of persons to raise issues has been greatly
liberalized.'57 The rule of Alderman "would be greatly undercut,"'5 s
he said, if the defendants had to assert, without the benefit of an ad-
versary proceeding to resolve the question of relevancy of the overheard
conversations, that their rights were violated.
1252 N.Y. Times, July 28, 1972, at 3, col. 3.
153 41 U.S.L.W. 2066 (July 29, 1972).
154 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1972, at 9, col. 2.
155 Id.
'0 Id. In his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
I am exceedingly reluctant to grant a stay where the case in a federal court is
barely underway.
41 U.S.L.W. 2066.
157 Id.
1258 Id.
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He noted that the recent decision in Eastern District had held that
warrantless electronic surveillance of "domestic" subversives was un-
constitutional. The Court has yet to decide on warrantless "foreign
intelligence" surveillance but Mr. Justice Douglas observes:
[I]n light of the casual way in which "foreign" as distinguished
from "domestic" surveillance was used on oral argument it may be
that we are dealing only with a question of semantics. 159
Mr. Justice Douglas concludes that "the constitutional right earn-
estly pressed here is the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment."' 60 Unless the defendants are granted "standing" to assert
the illegality of the electronic surveillance and to have an adversary
hearing on the transcripts of the overheard conversations, "the con-
stitutional fences protective of privacy are broken down."' 61
The United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
declined to upset the stay of the trial of the Pentagon papers case.162
VI. CONCLUSION
In Eastern District, warrantless "domestic security" electronic sur-
veillance was held unconstitutional. In the Pentagon papers case (Russo
v. Byrne), the Court will be faced with the question whether warrant-
less "foreign security" eavesdropping is likewise impermissible.
Significantly, the literature available on the subject of electronic
eavesdropping lacks a definitive explanation of the distinction between
"foreign intelligence" (or "foreign security") and "domestic intelli-
gence" surveillance. The terms have evaded the kind of analysis that
might result in their compartmentalization, perhaps because they were
formerly lumped together for constitutional purposes in the general
category of national security surveillance, perhaps because they are, in
fact, "indivisible."' 63 In any case, if the Court, in Russo, elects to treat
domestic and foreign wiretapping differently for warrant purposes,1'
thought must eventually (if not immediately) be given to a proper cir-
cumscription of each type of surveillance.
A number of suggestions and hints at such a formulation have
appeared over the years. Speaking in Alderman, Mr. Justice Fortas
proposed a rigid and limited definition of legitimate targets of foreign
159 Id. Concerning the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" surveillance, see
notes 163-70 and accompanying text infra.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 N.Y. Times, August 6, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
163 See text accompanying note 175 infra.
164 See text accompanying notes 171 and 173 infra.
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surveillance: material relating to any activities "specifically directed to
acts of sabotage, espionage or aggression by or on behalf of foreign
states."'165 Also in Alderman, Mr. Justice Harlan stated his preference
for an even more limited standard - only "spying for a foreign
power"'066 would qualify an individual as a foreign surveillance sub-
ject.1 6 7
The Court's most recent dicta on electronic surveillance invite
speculation that a more expansive view of foreign surveillance may be
taken in the future. Speaking for the Court in Eastern District, Mr.
Justice Powell noted that the decision did not address "issues which
may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their
agents."' ' In discussing domestic surveillance, Justice Powell distin-
guished a "domestic organization" from one that might be subject to
foreign intelligence surveillance by stating that the former is "a group
or organization (whether formally or informally constituted) composed
of citizens of the United States and which has no significant connection
with a foreign power, its agents or agencies."' 169 Thus, Mr. Justice
Powell might well conclude that a citizen or group of citizens having
significant connections with a foreign power would qualify as the agent
of such power.
Another member of the present Court has also indicated that he
favors a broader standard for foreign surveillance than those suggested
by former Justices Fortas and Harlan and President Roosevelt. Mr.
Justice Stewart has stated that "foreign intelligence information" is
that which is "necessary for the conduct of international affairs, and
for the protection of national defense secrets and installations from
foreign espionage and sabotage."'170
165 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 209 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
166M"d. at 198 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167 Even this position taken by Mr. Justice Harlan was not as narrow as that taken
by a recent chief executive. President Roosevelt not only opposed the introduction of
wiretap evidence in criminal prosecutions of American citizens but also requested that
any intelligence-gathering use of the devices be confined to aliens. See text accompanying
note 47 supra.
168 United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 322.
See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING To ELECRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE, § 3.1 (Feb. 1971). See also United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C.
1971); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970); United States v. Brown,
317 F. Supp. 531 (D. La. 1970); United States v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1969);
United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1969).
169 Id. at United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 309
n.8. (emphasis added).
170 Giordano v. United States, 389 U.S. 310, 314 (Stewart, J., concurring). See text
accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
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A question secondary to the definitional separation of foreign and
domestic surveillance is whether, if a warrant is not required for the
former, criminal prosecutions of persons not themselves legitimate
subjects of foreign eavesdropping should be permitted to be based on
conversations overheard on a foreign target's phone. Although it may
not be reached, this issue is present in the Russo case since the disputed
wiretap involved a member of the defense team, not himself the subject
of a wiretap, being overheard on another's phone.
There are several ways in which the Russo court might finally re-
solve the protracted controversy over exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. Due to the fact that national security cases involve "a convergence
of first and fourth amendment values,"'1' the Court would almost
certainly apply the Eastern District balancing test: the security of the
Nation and the preservation of its Government is to be weighed against
the potential danger to individual privacy and free expression posed
by lack of fourth amendment safeguards (prior judicial review by
a "neutral and detached" magistrate).
On one end of the range of possibilities, the Court might conclude
that warrantless "foreign security" electronic surveillance is included
within the constitutional powers of the President and that the Govern-
ment's statement as to the "foreignness" of a surveillance must be taken
as true. Thus, a warrant would not be required.
A second and remote possibility is that the Court might adopt the
diametrically opposed view favored by Mr. Justice Douglas. 172 The
Court might hold (a) that a warrant should be required in all surveil-
lance cases, both domestic and foreign, but (b) the difficulty of writing
a warrant which specifies the particular conversations to be seized would
make such a warrant tantamount to the general warrant the fourth
amendment was clearly intended to prohibit. The Court would thus
conclude that electronic surveillance is unconstitutional per se. In view
of Eastern District's implicit ratification of the use of electronic surveil-
lance techniques, such a decision is most unlikely.
A third, mid-range possibility is presented by Mr. Justice Doug-
las's notation that the Government's conception of the distinction be-
tween "foreign" and "domestic" surveillance is often blurred, reducing
the categories to "a question of semantics."'173 The Court might sustain
the assertion of inherent Presidential power as to "foreign security"
electronic surveillance while qualifying this holding by ordering the
171 United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 313.
172 See text accompanying note 141 supra.
173 41 U.S.L.W. 2066 (1972).
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district court to conduct a post-surveillance in camera proceeding to
determine that the surveillance was, in fact, "foreign" and not "do-
mestic." However, definitional problems would no doubt arise, particu-
larly when a surveillance that originally involved "foreign" intelligence
information extended to a "domestic" activity.
The final possibility is that the Court might require issuance of a
warrant for each and every electronic surveillance, be it "domestic" or
"foreign." Ironically, one of the most persuasive arguments for this
position was unwittingly advanced by the Government in Eastern Dis-
trict. In its brief to the Court, the Government emphasized that "to
attempt to compartmentalize national security into rigid separate seg-
ments of foreign and domestic ignores the realities of the way in which
many organizations . . . operate . . .-174 Former Attorney General
Mitchell, in an address made while he still held that office, underscored
the difficulty of distinguishing "foreign" from "domestic." Mr. Mitchell
declared:
[N]ational security is indivisible. You cannot separate foreign
from domestic threats to the Government and say that we should
meet one less decisively than the other. I don't see how we can
separate the two, but if it were possible, I would say that experience
has shown greater danger from the so-called domestic activity.175
These statements by the Government and its highest legal officer,
combined with the Court's Eastern District requirement of a warrant
for "domestic security" surveillance, make the logic of this final pos-
sibility compelling. If Government inconvenience, caused by the added
burden of a warrant were a concern, it could be remedied by Congres-
sional adoption of the protective standards suggested by Mr. Justice
Powell in Eastern District,17 6 especially the designation of the District
Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as the court to
which the Government should make application for an electronic sur-
veillance warrant.
In its deliberations, the Court should be aware of the caution
voiced by Mr. Justice Douglas in an opinion joined by Mr. Justice
Brennan:
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate.
In matters where they believe national security may be involved
they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or
174 Brief for Petitioner at 34.
175 Mitchell, Remarks of Attorney General John N. Mitchell Before the 1971 Ken-
tucky State Bar Annual Banquet, 35 Ky. S.B.J. 26, 31 (July 1971) (emphasis added).
176 407 U.S. at 523.
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magistrate must be.... The President and Attorney General are
properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national
security cases.... Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like
[Katz], I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved
adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when
the President and Attorney General assume both the position of
adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.177
177 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
PosrscnUyr
After research for this paper was completed, the Supreme Court issued a decision
indicating that, henceforth, trial courts are not to unquestioningly accept official Gov-
ernment denials of illegal electronic surveillance. (See text accompanying notes 145-55
supra.)
Claiming unauthorized eavesdropping, 17-year-old Jeffrey H. Smilow, defendant-
appellant in Smilow v. United States (U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 72-316), refused to
testify before a grand jury investigating fire bombing incidents. When the Justice De-
partment stated that "there had been no unauthorized wiretapping of the youth" (168
N.Y.L.J. 79, October 25, 1972, at 5, col. 1), Smilow was convicted of contempt, a conviction
that was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on July 20, 1972. 11 CR. L. 2490
(1972).
On October 24, 1972, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit "for further consideration in light
of the position presently asserted by the Government." 41 US.L.W. 3229 (1972). The
Supreme Court order came after the Justice Department conceded that Smilow "might
have been overheard 'in the course of an electronic surveillance conducted with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General in the interests of national security."' 168 N.Y.L.J. 79,
October 25, 1972, at 5, col. 1. The warrantless wiretap alluded to was not on the defendant's
phone but on a phone of the Jewish Defense League, an organization that reportedly
employed Smilow. Id. (See text at page 104 supra.)
The Smilow case suggests that, when confronted with an allegation of illegal wire-
tapping, a trial court should examine all pertinent Government surveillance logs in an in
camera hearing before ruling on disclosure.
